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Mispricing in the Medicare Advantage Risk 
Adjustment Model
Jing Chen, PhD, MBA1, Randall P. Ellis, PhD2,4, Katherine H. Toro, MA,  
and Arlene S. Ash, PhD3,4
Abstract
The Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) implemented hierarchical condition category (HCC) models in 
2004 to adjust payments to Medicare Advantage (MA) plans to reflect enrollees’ expected health care costs. We use Verisk 
Health’s diagnostic cost group (DxCG) Medicare models, refined “descendants” of the same HCC framework with 189 
comprehensive clinical categories available to CMS in 2004, to reveal 2 mispricing errors resulting from CMS’ implementation. 
One comes from ignoring all diagnostic information for “new enrollees” (those with less than 12 months of prior claims). 
Another comes from continuing to use the simplified models that were originally adopted in response to assertions from 
some capitated health plans that submitting the claims-like data that facilitate richer models was too burdensome. Even 
the main CMS model being used in 2014 recognizes only 79 condition categories, excluding many diagnoses and merging 
conditions with somewhat heterogeneous costs. Omitted conditions are typically lower cost or “vague” and not easily 
audited from simplified data submissions. In contrast, DxCG Medicare models use a comprehensive, 394-HCC classification 
system. Applying both models to Medicare’s 2010-2011 fee-for-service 5% sample, we find mispricing and lower predictive 
accuracy for the CMS implementation. For example, in 2010, 13% of beneficiaries had at least 1 higher cost DxCG-recognized 
condition but no CMS-recognized condition; their 2011 actual costs averaged US$6628, almost one-third more than the CMS 
model prediction. As MA plans must now supply encounter data, CMS should consider using more refined and comprehensive 
(DxCG-like) models.
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Introduction
In 2013, the US Medicare program provided health insur-
ance coverage to 52 million beneficiaries entitled by age 
greater than 64, disability, or end stage renal disease (ESRD).1 
Medicare spending accounted for 16% (US$536 billion) of 
the federal budget and is projected to double by 2023 due to 
increasing numbers of beneficiaries and costs per person.2,3
Medicare beneficiaries can enroll in a private sector 
option called Medicare Advantage (MA) rather than receive 
the traditional fee-for-service (FFS) benefit. In 2013, 28% of 
Medicare beneficiaries were enrolled in MA.4 Historically, 
MA plan premiums were linked to FFS expenditures by geo-
graphic area, with payments set at 95% of an enrollee’s coun-
ty’s adjusted average per capita cost. Adjustments to the 
county average were purely demographic, and explained 
very little variation in expenditures; in particular, MA plans 
were not paid more for enrolling sicker people.5 Thus, the 
Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS), which 
administers Medicare, sought a health-risk-based model for 
paying MA plans. It considered using self-reported status for 
risk adjustment, as well as several methods that extract diag-
noses from medical claims data, including the Adjusted 
Clinical Groups (ACGs) system,6 the Chronic Disease and 
Disability Payment System (CDPS),7 Clinical Risk Groups 
(CRGs),8 the clinically detailed risk information system for 
cost (CD-RISC),9 and the diagnostic cost group/hierarchical 
condition categories (DCG/HCCs).10 Kanika Kapur, a 
researcher at the RAND Corporation wrote, “CMS chose the 
DCG/HCC model for Medicare risk adjustment, largely on 
the basis of transparency, ease of modification, and good 
clinical coherence.”11
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The HCC models calculate payments to MA plans based 
on enrollee’s age, gender, and diagnoses. The HCC frame-
work requires classifying all coded diagnoses into condition 
categories (CCs) and using hierarchies to eliminate redun-
dant recognition of a single underlying medical problem. 
First implemented in 2004, the CMS-HCC models are peri-
odically updated.
Verisk Health, a private for-profit health analytics firm, 
estimates and supports DxCG Medicare HCC models, origi-
nally relying on CMS’ 189 CCs.10
For implementation, the CMS-HCC payment models 
have omitted and consolidated many CCs, now recognizing 
approximately 80 distinct conditions. In contrast, today’s 
DxCG Medicare (Version 7) models exploit the full detail of 
a comprehensive classification system with 394 HCCs.
In this article, we use DxCG Medicare models to illustrate 
and quantify both lack of available precision and mispric-
ing—that is, differences between actual and CMS-model-
predicted costs—in CMS payment model implementation. 
We hypothesized that CMS models would “underprice” peo-
ple whose costly diagnoses were recognized only by the 
DxCG model and “overprice” those with no medical prob-
lems detected by either model.
HCC Models
Both CMS-HCC and DxCG Medicare risk adjustment mod-
els are linear regression models using demographic informa-
tion (age, sex, Medicaid dual eligibility, and reasons for 
Medicare eligibility) as well as the profiles of major medical 
conditions in a base year to predict “costs” in the following, 
or target, year. Costs are payments for services covered by 
Medicare’s hospital insurance (part A) and supplementary 
medical insurance (part B) benefit. Medicare has yet another 
model for its ESRD program. MA CMS payments (but not 
DxCG predictions) also consider whether the beneficiary is 
institutionalized (eg, living in a nursing home) or “new,” that 
is, enrolled for less than 12 full months.
Both models first classify all (approximately 16 000) 
International Classification of Diseases, 9th Revision, 
Clinical Modification (ICD-9-CM) diagnosis codes into 
CCs. Each CC contains clinically related groups of diagno-
ses, such as colon cancer and rectal cancer, with similar cost 
implications. Hierarchies are imposed so that a person is 
coded for only the most severe manifestation among related 
diseases (eg, someone with cystic fibrosis would not also be 
coded for either “chronic obstructive lung disease” or cough). 
This converts CCs into HCCs. Both models also include 
interactions between disease groups (eg, diabetes and con-
gestive heart failure) and between diseases and disability sta-
tus (eg, disability and congestive heart failure) so long as 
they make sense to clinicians and strongly predict additional 
costs.12
Prior to adopting the HCC modeling framework, CMS 
explored and rejected using nonlinear models with interactions 
for all diseases. The overall R2s for such models were only 
slightly larger than the basic linear model. And although 
their predictions were more accurate for people with expected 
low costs, they mispriced people in categories defined by 
age, sex, and other variables. After substantial model testing, 
CMS decided to add selected interaction terms (eg, between 
2 or more HCCs) to a linear model.
In contrast to linear models, nonlinear models are more 
cumbersome to estimate, more difficult to explain to stake-
holders, and more strongly incentivize diagnostic upcoding 
(laying claim to both more, and more serious forms of, dis-
eases than actually present) because of the large marginal 
increase in predicted expenditures for individuals with many 
diagnoses. Including interaction terms in a linear model also 
incentivizes upcoding, but the HCCs used in interactions can 
be restricted to medical conditions that are less subject to 
discretionary coding variations, and the effects of interac-
tions are more transparent.12 Despite their theoretical 
appeal—and undisputed advantages for hypothesis testing—
more complex models can be inferior to linear models for 
calculating payments in samples exceeding a million obser-
vations.13-15 Econometrician Andrew Jones reviewed the evi-
dence, concluding that “the simple linear model, estimated 
by OLS, performs quite well across all of the criteria.”16
CMS-HCC Models
CMS implements distinct risk models for beneficiaries enti-
tled by age, disability, or ESRD, and for community-residing 
versus long-term institutional (nursing home) enrollees. 
Unlike the CMS-HCC models for “continuing” MA mem-
bers, the payment formula for “new” Medicare enrollees 
(enrolled for less than 12 months in the base year) uses no 
diagnostic information.
Prior to the Affordable Care Act (2010), MA plans were 
exempted from submitting encounter records. Although 
CMS calibrated its models on FFS data with full ICD-9-CM 
coding, risk-adjusted MA payments are calculated from a 
short list, submitted by the plan, of the CCs present for each 
person. Model recalibration for 2014 used 2010 100% FFS 
claims data to predict 2011 costs.17
The original CMS-HCC payment models included 70 
HCCs; even the 2014 CMS models include only 79 HCCs 
(87 HCCs for its ESRD models). Newly added HCCs are 
either previously unrecognized conditions among the 189 
HCCs available or splits/collapses of previously included 
HCCs.17
The simplified method for capturing information on a 
small number of well-reimbursed CCs makes upcoding both 
easy and profitable for MA plans. The US Government 
Accountability Office report of 2012 estimated that the more 
aggressive diagnostic coding in MA plans than in Medicare 
FFS caused as much as US$5.8 billion overpayments to MA 
plans in 2010, of which only US$2.7 billion was recouped by 
CMS’ adjustments for this difference.18
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DxCG Medicare Models
As described, DxCG Medicare models share the same basic 
HCC structure as CMS models, but consider up to 394 HCCs 
for prediction. Altogether 138 of the DxCG HCCs have 0 
weight in the Medicare models, with the omitted set chosen 
using statistical criteria, clinical judgment, and practical con-
siderations, balancing the desire for greater accuracy against 
the principle that difficult-to-verify distinctions in medical 
problems should not result in large distinctions in payment. 
Like the CMS models, the DxCG Medicare models exclude 
many low-cost, vague, and discretionary conditions—includ-
ing hypertension and high cholesterol—to reduce opportuni-
ties for manipulating payments by aggressive upcoding. 
Regression coefficients were estimated using FFS claims 
data for beneficiaries with both parts A and B insurance in 
Medicare’s 2005-2006 5% sample. Unlike CMS’ implemen-
tation, prior-year diagnoses are used in all enrollees’ predic-
tions, not just for continuing enrollees. Finally, DxCG 
modelers use second-stage regression splining to ensure that 
mean predictions closely approximate actual spending within 
each subgroup defined by age and gender across the spec-
trum of low-, middle-, and high-risk individuals. In this way, 
the models use nonlinear fine-tuning to stabilize and tailor 
outputs from a straightforward, underlying linear modeling 
structure.
The Data
The data pertain to 1.5 million enrollees from Medicare’s 
2010-2011 FFS 5% sample: enrolled exclusively in FFS, 
present and eligible for parts A and B coverage for at least 1 
month in each year, and not currently entitled to the ESRD 
program (see Table A1 of the appendix).
Medicare “allowed costs” are those covered by the com-
bined parts A and B benefit. We summed these for each ben-
eficiary, during all “eligible months” in 2011: that is, months 
of nonhospice, parts A and B enrollment in FFS Medicare. 
We annualized these sums by dividing by the fraction of the 
year that the person was eligible, and conducted all analyses 
using this fraction as a weight. Thus, data for a person with 
US$10 000 of costs over 6 eligible months is treated as ½ an 
observation at US$20 000 per year; this leads to correct 
monthly cost estimates for each beneficiary, including those 
who die.19
Both DxCG and CMS models use 2010 data to predict 
eligibility-weighted, annualized costs in 2011. The only dis-
tinction is that CMS models are designed to predict “paid” 
costs whereas the DxCG models “allowed” amounts. The 
amount paid equals the amount allowed minus deductibles 
and copayments. In this article, and in our modeling, we use 
allowed amounts because they are more closely linked to 
actual resource use and less subject to variation in plan-level 
cost-sharing features. Nonetheless, annual paid and allowed 
amounts are highly correlated (in our sample, ρ = .998), and 
predictions evaluated with either outcome should perform 
similarly.
Both CMS and DxCG models generate relative risk scores 
(RRSs). Indeed, the CMS-HCC software automatically gen-
erates 3 RRSs for each person: new enrollee RRS, continu-
ing enrollee (or “community model”) RRS, and institutional 
model RRS (usually for enrollees living in a nursing home). 
Users must choose the appropriate RRS for each enrollee: 
either new, or if continuing, whether community dwelling or 
institutionalized. We have not examined the institutional 
model. Instead, we evaluate the CMS model in 2 ways: first, 
following CMS’ approach of using the new enrollee model 
RRS for members enrolled for less than 12 months in 2010, 
and using the risk score from the community model for 
everyone else; second, we used the RRS from the commu-
nity model for everyone. We will call the first method “CMS 
implemented” (as of 2014) and the second, “CMS improved.”
To generate predicted costs from any HCC model, risk 
scores must be converted by applying a multiplier—the pay-
ment associated with next year’s average cost—prior to 
knowing that cost. We ignore the forecasting error associated 
with that unknown, and level the playing field among mod-
els, by choosing multiplicative factors to make each model’s 
weighted mean predictions exactly match weighted mean 
actual (allowed) cost in the 2011 sample, separately for new 
and continuing enrollees.
All models in this study rely on the same basic HCC 
structure, use identical demographic predictors, and identify 
diagnoses from the same claims records. We call Verisk 
Health’s DxCG Medicare Model the “DxCG model”; its 
principal distinguishing characteristic is its reliance on a 
refined, comprehensive classification of up to 394 CCs.
Results
First we compared overall accuracy by examining each mod-
el’s R2 when using its “off-the-shelf” (unmodified, as fit to 
other data) RRSs to predict cost (cost = a + b × RRS) in 
Medicare 2010-2011 FFS 5% file data.
Table 1 examines and compares the performance of 3 
such models: the CMS implemented and improved 2014 
models, and the DxCG model. Each model was previously 
developed on Medicare FFS data: the CMS-HCC models on 
2010-2011 100% files, and the DxCG model on 2005-2006 
5% files; thus, each model uses just 1 degree of freedom to 
predict in this article’s “validation set,” and there is no con-
cern about overfitting. We separately inspected 3 groups: the 
full population, new enrollees (those with less than 12 
months of eligibility in the base year), and continuing (ie, 
non-new) enrollees, to explore the extent to which, by ignor-
ing diagnostic information for new enrollees, CMS-HCC 
models lead to mispayments within this subgroup.
The contrast between the CMS implemented and improved 
columns shows that the CMS could increase its predictive 
accuracy (R2) simply by applying its own community model 
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to new enrollees. The R2 improvement within the new 
enrollee population itself is huge (from 2.0% to 17.2%), but 
because few members are new, this only increases the whole-
population R2 from 13.8% to 14.2%. The whole-population 
R2 for the DxCG model is 16.5%.
Other performance measures involve comparing a mod-
el’s predicted payments for groups of people to their actual 
costs. For example, plans that enroll members with serious, 
high-cost-generating conditions should receive funds ade-
quate to care for them; more generally, with a good model, 
most moderately large, prospectively identifiable subgroups 
will have similar predicted payments and actual costs. We 
will examine mispayment, that is, differences between mean 
model-predicted payments and actual costs, and compute 
overpayment percentages (predicted payment minus actual 
cost, divided by actual cost) for various subgroups and 
models.
Mispayments by Model-Predicted Risk Quantiles
We evaluated model discrimination by sorting the popula-
tion into quantiles of increasing CMS-model-predicted 
cost and calculating mean (observed) Medicare cost and 
percent mispricing for quantile-based groups. Table 2 
shows the actual year 2 costs by prediction quantiles from 
the CMS implemented model and associated overpay-
ment percentages. Note that the model makes large dis-
tinctions among beneficiaries; average costs of those with 
the 1% highest predictions are nearly 20 times as much as 
for the bottom 20%. However, we also care about “cali-
bration”—Do the plans pay correctly across the spectrum 
of expected costs? The last column of Table 2 shows the 
percent over- or underpayment within each subpopula-
tion; CMS underpays both those in the top 5% and those 
in the bottom 20% of expected costs. For example, while 
those in the bottom 20% actually cost about US$4000, the 
CMS model would have paid out 12% less, only about 
US$3500.
Mispayments by the Presence/Absence of Various 
Kinds of Diagnoses
We further examine means and mispricing separately for 
members who have and do not have any diagnoses recog-
nized by the CMS classification system. Here we contrast 
mispricing under both the CMS implemented and DxCG 
models, for everyone and separately among new enroll-
ees. As shown in the top half of Table 3 (and in Figure 1), 
both models allocate the correct total payment to the 66% 
of members with at least one clinical condition recog-
nized by CMS’ implementation. For the remaining 34%, 
with no HCCs identified by CMS, there is substantial mis-
pricing within subgroups. For members with no HCC in 
either system (7%), CMS overpays by 44% whereas the 
DxCG model gets the average right. The remaining 27% 
of members can be split into the 13% of members with at 
least one higher cost DxCG condition not recognized by 
CMS, and those with only lower cost conditions. The 
CMS model underpays the higher cost DxCG conditions 
by 25% and overpays those with only low-cost DxCG 
HCCs by 17%. Table 3 also examines the same informa-
tion for new enrollees. Because CMS ignores diagnostic 
information for new enrollees, it underpays those with 
CMS conditions by 35%, and overpays the rest, especially 
the healthiest 25% of members costing less than US$4000 
each, for whom it pays over US$8000. In contrast, the 
DxCG model’s expected costs are close to observed costs 
across these subgroups.
Discussion and Conclusions
We examined CMS and DxCG Medicare models in Medicare 
FFS data, finding 2 changes that Medicare could implement 
to predict more accurately. These are as follows: use what-
ever diagnoses are present to distinguish among “new” 
enrollees with less than 12 months of base year data, and 
adopt a more refined and comprehensive predictive tool, 
such as Verisk Health’s DxCG model. The first change 
requires only an administrative decision to implement. By 
ignoring differences in diagnosed disease among members 
enrolled for less than 12 months, CMS-HCC’s current imple-
mentation creates incentives for MA plans to enroll healthier 
Medicare enrollees and “penalties” (at least in the first year) 
for plans enrolling people who are already sick. The second 
Table 1. Off-the-Shelf R2 for Predicting Next Year’s Medicare 
Cost: CMS-HCC Versus DxCG Models.
CMS-HCC 2014 models
 
Implementeda 
(%)
Improvedb 
(%)
DxCG 
modelc (%)
All enrollees 13.8 14.2 16.5
New enrollees  2.0 17.2 19.0
Continuing enrollees 14.1 14.1 16.4
Source. Medicare FFS 5% sample, present in both 2010 and 2011, excluding 
those with 2010 ESRD (N = 1 487 628). All models use 2010 information 
to predict 2011 Medicare cost.
Note. Each so-called “off-the-shelf” models have 1 degree of freedom; 
each regresses cost on a formula-based risk score: cost = a + b × (risk 
score). The CMS-HCC 2014 models were calibrated on 100% FFS 2010-
2011 data; DxCG models were calibrated on the 2005-2006 Medicare 
FFS 5% sample. Both models predict next year’s costs from beneficiary 
age, sex, Medicaid dual eligibility, original reason for Medicare entitlement, 
and diagnoses from the previous year’s inpatient, outpatient, and carrier-
file claims. CMS-HCC = Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services 
hierarchical condition category; FFS = fee-for-service; ESRD = end stage 
renal disease; RRS = relative risk score.
a“Implemented” means using the new enrollee model RRS for members 
enrolled for less than 12 months in 2010, and using the risk score from 
the community model for everyone else.
bImproved means using the RRS from the community model for every 
enrollee.
cDxCG, Version 7, Model 121.
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change takes more work. The CMS-HCC model seeks to 
include CCs based on their association with next year’s costs 
for Medicare parts A and B benefits. CCs with small coeffi-
cients, low t-values, so few beneficiaries that the coefficient 
is unstable, or composed of poorly specified diagnostic codes 
are excluded, from both CMS 10,12 and DxCG models. 
However, in 2004, CMS had an additional, political, reason 
to limit the number of categories recognized in its initial 
model: Many managed care organizations (MCOs) balked at 
supplying the detailed diagnostic information from encoun-
ter records, which automatically populate models recogniz-
ing all diseases that drive costs. Thus, the CMS model 
dropped 88 of the 189 existing HCCs in its payment model 
and merged others; plans were only asked to certify annually 
the presence/absence of each of approximately 70 to 80 
remaining medical conditions for each of its enrolled benefi-
ciaries. The reduction in explanatory power (as compared 
with a fuller model) was viewed as “acceptably small,” in the 
Table 3. 2011 Mean Costs, Model-Based Payments, and Percent Over- and Underpayments for Subgroups of People by Types of 
Conditions.
Model-based payments
 CMS, as implemented DxCG, as recommended
Groups Subgroups %
Mean actual 
costs Mean Errora (%) Mean Errora (%)
All enrollees (N = 1 487 628) Any CMS-HCC 66 $15 715 $15 743 0 $15 677 0
No CMS-HCC 34 $4886 $4833 $4957  
 Any higher cost DxCG-HCCb 13 $6628 $4975 −25 $6852 3
 Only low-cost DxCG-HCCsc 14 $3997 $4665 17 $3955 −1
 No recognized HCC 7 $3403 $4906 44 $3416 0
Total 100 $11 943 $11 943 $11 943  
New enrollee subgroup  
(n = 68 671)
Any CMS-HCC 41 $14 346 $9263 −35 $14 307 0
No CMS-HCC: 59 $4385 $7823 $4411  
 Any higher cost DxCG-HCCb 11 $6355 $7843 23 $6761 6
 Only low-cost DxCG-HCCsc 23 $3989 $7502 88 $4083 2
 No recognized HCC 25 $3846 $8115 111 $3634 −6
Total 100 $8405 $8405 $8405  
Source. Medicare FFS 5% sample, present in both 2010 and 2011, excluding those with 2010 ESRD (N = 1 487 628). Both models use 2010 information to 
predict 2011 Medicare cost. The CMS model uses its 2014 update calibrated on 2010-2011 data; the DxCG model, Version 7, was calibrated on 2005-
2006 data.
Note. CMS = Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services; HCC = hierarchical condition category; FFS = fee-for-service; ESRD = end stage renal disease.
aError is calculated as (payment − cost) / cost. For example, −6% means that what the model expects (and what a payment system based on it would pay) 
is 6% less than the actual cost.
bThe conditions with the highest 100 coefficients in the DxCG model from the subgroup after excluding people with any conditions classified in the CMS-
HCC.
cAll DxCG-HCC conditions not previously classified.
Table 2. Mean Medicare Cost and Mispricing by 2014 CMS-HCC Implemented Model-Predicted Percentile Groups.
Percentile groups based on 2014 CMS-HCC 
predictionsa
Mean Medicare cost 
in 2011
% overpayment by 2014 
CMS-HCC modelb
Top 1% $78 584 −5
Next 4% $44 371 −2
Percentiles 90%-95% $29 072 2
80%-90% $19 831 4
50%-80% $11 880 2
20%-50% $6457 0
Bottom 20% $4022 −12
Source. Medicare FFS 5% sample, present in both 2010 and 2011, excluding those with 2010 ESRD (N = 1 487 628). All models use 2010 information to 
predict 2011 Medicare cost.
Note. CMS-HCC = Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services hierarchical condition category; FFS = fee-for-service; ESRD = end stage renal disease.
aUsing the “as implemented” algorithm—that is, ignoring all diagnoses for new enrollees.
bPercentages are calculated as (predicted payment − actual cost) / actual cost. For example, −5 means that what the model expects (and what a payment 
system based on it would pay) is 5% less than the actual cost.
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context of the MCO industry’s assertions that existing, long-
term subcapitation contracts meant that they could not sup-
ply full encounter data. This compromise led to CMS 
adopting a simpler, easier to implement, but more easily 
manipulated, less easily audited, and—as we confirm here—
notably less accurate, model.
As shown in this article, the DxCG Medicare model, 
despite being developed on an earlier, smaller data set 
(Medicare 2005-2006 5% FFS) than CMS’ current model 
(developed on Medicare 2010-2011 100% FFS), predicts 
costs more accurately due to its more refined and granular 
HCCs. More accurate predictions help reduce incentives 
for selection, improve payment fairness for the included 
rarer, high-cost conditions, and reduce financial risk for 
MA plans.
Now, with about 30% of Medicare beneficiaries enrolled 
in MA, with physicians coding with more specificity, and 
with Affordable Care Act (ACA) requiring that MA plans 
submit encounter data that include all diagnoses, additional 
research is warranted to explore the sensitivity of simplified 
versus refined, comprehensive models to aggressive, hard-
to-audit upcoding. Reduced sensitivity to upcoding may 
require further refinements. Addressing behavioral 
responses to risk adjustment, as many researchers have dis-
cussed, is another area for further research.20,21 Our sug-
gested improvements to the current CMS-HCC models 
corrects some, although likely not all, of the troublesome 
payment and incentives problems related to under- and 
overprediction of costs for large groups of prospectively 
identifiable people. Given that models similar to the CMS-
HCCs for MA are also used for part D, for health insurance 
exchanges and for diverse research evaluations, improving 
the classification and modeling approaches seems especially 
worthwhile.
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